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How Discrimination and Bias Shape Outcomes 
Kevin Lang (Boston University & NBER) and Ariella Kahn-Lang Spitzer (Mathematica) 
1. Introduction 
We all use information about the groups to which other people belong in order to 
determine how we should treat them. We may use that information consciously or 
unconsciously, and it may be based on accurate statistical inference or inaccurate beliefs. 
Consequently, our treatment of other individuals can depend on the groups with which we 
associate them. Importantly, using statistical information based on race or other observable 
factors to make inferences about someone, can impact either or both parties’ behavior: students 
may respond to their teachers’ low expectations by not working hard. To some extent, 
discrimination is necessary and efficient. But in other cases, discrimination can create and 
maintain a system of inequality. 
 In this chapter we primarily focus on discrimination based on race. However, we 
discriminate on far more than just race, including gender, sexual orientation, religion, ethnicity, 
and almost any other observable characteristic. Even race, itself, is a somewhat ambiguous 
distinction, and one that has evolved over time. While today many people conflate race with skin 
color, historically these concepts were distinct. For example, in the first half of the 20th century, 
southern and eastern European (SEE) immigrants were considered both white and racially 
inferior. This is reflected in low rates of intermarriage. In 1910-1920, 86 percent of married 
second-generation Italian women age 18 to 33 were married to first or second-generation Italian 
immigrants, a rate of endogamy that is higher than among Asians and Hispanics today. Over 
time, in a process which has been described as “becoming white,” social distance between SEE 
immigrants and whites decreased, intermarriage rates increased, and SEE immigrants gradually 
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were no longer considered racially distinct from whites, a process that some see Asians and 
Hispanics undergoing currently.i In other words, even our conceptions of how we define race, 
and who belongs to which race, are shaped by societal perceptions and social norms.  
In the U.S., we have substantial evidence of racial disparities across domains including, 
but not limited to, the labor market, education, criminal justice, health, and housing. The 
evidence suggests that in each domain, at least some is due to discrimination.  
As represented in figure 1, disparities are both the cause and result of discrimination. The 
fact that blacks are more likely than whites to come from disadvantaged backgrounds means that, 
on average, they arrive in kindergarten less prepared for school. This leads some teachers to have 
lower expectations for their black students which can produce further disparities in outcomes. 
Similarly, disparities both cause and are caused by racial identity. Racial disparities across 
domains contribute to residential and social distance between groups. Disparities between groups 
can be incorporated into a sense of within-race identity. Since group membership is important, 
our identities as a member of a group may be also be important to us. We may generate a sense 
of well-being by confirming this identity. We may also be rewarded by other members of the 
group for confirming and punished or shunned if we do not. These group identities help create 
social distance between groups. Differences in language and norms of behavior can lead to 
miscommunication or to a reduced ability to assess members of a different group. This, too, can 
contribute to discrimination and reinforce disparities. And, identity and discrimination reinforce 
each other. Identity contributes to the salience of race, and discrimination adds to social distance. 
Disparities also reinforce each other. Harsher treatment by the justice system makes it 
more difficult for blacks to get good jobs or rent homes in better neighborhoods. This makes 
their children more likely to attend low quality schools. And, so on. This perspective means that 
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ultimately eliminating discrimination requires reducing disparities across a large range of 
outcomes or finding key points of leverage. 
We argue that policy designed to address discrimination will be most effective when the 
dynamics of discrimination are considered. Simply prohibiting discrimination does not work to 
stop discrimination, partially because we can still discriminate based on factors correlated with 
race. Further, prohibiting discrimination based on factors correlated with race can actually 
increase race-based discrimination. Instead, we argue that the most effective policies are those 
which can decrease disparities in outcomes and decrease residential or social distance between 
races. Education and more integrated housing are plausible candidate for focused policy. 
 
2. What is Discrimination? 
We distinguish between prejudice, which refers to tastes, preferences or inaccurate 
beliefs, and discrimination, which refers to actions or outcomes. Someone who dislikes working 
for a female supervisor is prejudiced. So is someone who has incorrect statistical beliefs such as 
that immigrants are more likely than natives to commit felonies. But, if these people do not 
change their behavior as a result of their prejudice, they are not discriminating. To discriminate 
is to actively treat someone differently based on characteristics such as race, gender, ethnicity, or 
sexual orientation. Moreover, such behavior may not result in a discriminatory outcome. If the 
subjects of the discrimination can easily compensate for or avoid the discriminatory behavior, it 
is inconsequential. In some settings (but certainly not all), discriminatory behavior by a small 
number of people can be inconsequential and thus not lead to a discriminatory outcome. 
Economists differentiate between “Prejudice-Based” (or Taste-Based) and “Statistical” 
discrimination. Taste-based discrimination occurs when we treat people differently because we 
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dislike or have false beliefs about people with that characteristic, for example, if an employer 
hires male candidates more frequently because she prefers working with males. In contrast, 
statistical discrimination describes differential treatment of individuals based on statistically 
valid inferences made using group membership, that is using observable characteristics such as 
race to make statistically valid inferences that affect how we treat different people.  
Statistical discrimination is universal. You are more likely to give up your seat on the bus 
for an elderly lady than a tall and broad young man. This is based on the perception that the 
elderly lady needs it more. But you don’t know this. The young male may be recovering from 
surgery. You are just going with the odds. In other words, you are discriminating statistically. 
We all use signals of dress and, for better or worse, age, sex, and race to make statistical 
inferences about people and act on those inferences. Statistical discrimination is often both legal 
and socially acceptable. Insurance companies pay for routine mammograms for older women but 
not for older men because the risk of breast cancer among men is low, although not zero. 
However, whether insurance companies should be able to charge men and women differentially 
for health, disability, life, and auto insurance is controversial and varies among states. 
As a society we also accept taste-based discrimination in some settings. Some state courts 
have used privacy considerations to permit female-only health clubs as an exception to civil 
rights law outlawing sex discrimination in public accommodations. We often accept taste-based 
discrimination intended to counteract other forms of discrimination. While controversial, certain 
types of affirmative action are legal and broadly considered socially acceptable. 
In this chapter we will highlight when studies are able to distinguish between statistical 
and taste-based discrimination. This can be helpful because understanding which form of 
discrimination is at work can help us to better identify potentially effective policy solutions. 
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However, even in cases when we can identify discrimination, it is often impossible to distinguish 
between the two forms. 
Discrimination may also be conscious or reflect implicit bias. People may have 
associations of which they are unaware and that may even contradict their expressed beliefs. 
Implicit discrimination, documented by a large literature in social psychology, occurs when one 
treats members of groups differently based on these associations.ii Thus, an employer may 
unintentionally tend to choose white candidates because she unconsciously associates white with 
greater intelligence.  
 Implicit discrimination could reflect dislike or the accurate or inaccurate use of statistical 
association. Since many individuals who identify as African American also demonstrate implicit 
bias against their own group, it is unlikely that the bias is solely dislike. On the other hand, since 
implicit bias against African Americans is more common among European Americans, it is 
unlikely that everyone unconsciously uses statistical association in an unbiased way. It is 
plausible that implicit bias reflects statistical associations unfiltered by rational updating. 
 Finally, discriminatory outcomes may not be the result of discrimination on the part of a 
given individual, but instead the result of institution-level policy or practice. For example, a 
policy that enforces harsher mandatory sentences on possession of crack cocaine relative to 
cocaine powder disproportionally impacts blacks relative to whites and therefore leads to 
discriminatory outcomes. In some cases, these policies may have been designed by a 
discriminating individual or a group of discriminating individuals. In other cases, discriminatory 
outcomes may be the unintended effects of the policy or practice. In either case, institutional 
level discrimination can lead to widespread discriminatory outcomes. This is also referred to as 
systemic discrimination. In this chapter we primarily focus on individual and group level 
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discrimination although many of the factors that favor discrimination by individuals will also be 
operative in influencing institutional behavior. 
 
3. Where Do We Discriminate? 
Identifying and measuring discrimination is notoriously challenging. While we can measure 
disparities between different groups in various settings, such disparities do not necessarily reflect 
discrimination. Differences could reflect differences in preferences, innate differences between 
groups, and/or unequal treatment prior to contact with a given institution. For example, the 
absence of women in the National Football League could reflect biological differences between 
males and females or that young girls have less access to youth football and therefore do not 
develop the skills and interest. It seems less likely to be driven by the discriminatory exclusion of 
a substantial number of qualified women. 
So how do we identify discrimination? We cannot conduct randomized controlled trials 
in which we randomly assign some people to be black and some to be white. We can pretend that 
some people are white and others black, but as we will see, this is not quite the same thing. 
Social scientists have used a number of techniques to try to identify discrimination in a wide 
variety of settings including the labor market, medical care, education, criminal justice and 
consumer markets, including credit and housing markets.  
In this section, we provide a brief overview of this literature. We refer readers looking for 
lengthier descriptions of empirical research on the existence of discrimination to refer to the 
following footnotes: labor market,iii education,iv criminal justice,v housing and residential 
segregation,vi and medical treatment.vii  However, it is worth highlighting that these settings do 
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not work in isolation. It is important to note their interconnected nature, through which 
disparities in one domain can reinforce disparities in another. 
 
The Labor Market 
 A substantial literature documents differences in labor market outcomes among members 
of different races and ethnicities. Kahn-Lang shows that in 2010 black men were 28 percent less 
likely to be employed and earned 31 percent less annually conditional on working.viii While this 
does not prove there is discrimination, it suggests this may be an important domain in which to 
consider it.  
A number of researchers have attempted to isolate discrimination by looking at how 
much of the racial wage gap can be explained by observable characteristics such as education, 
test scores, location, etc. While results depend on the data source and the observable 
characteristics considered, these studies nearly all find that, after accounting for observables, a 
smaller but still significant wage gap remains.ix . A typical finding is that the hourly earnings gap 
between blacks and whites falls by a little over half when we control for age, education and a 
measure of cognitive skill.x While useful, this approach has substantial weaknesses. First, there 
may be worker characteristics, correlated with race, for which we cannot control. For example, 
measures of school quality are often missing from data sets and are imperfect when included, but 
blacks are likely to have attended lower quality schools. Second, we risk over-controlling for 
observables. For example, the difference in the occupational distribution of blacks and whites 
might explain a substantial portion of the earnings differential but also reflect discrimination. 
Despite these concerns, it is interesting to note that, conditional on family income when 
they were growing up, black and white women have similar wages and hours and thus personal 
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incomes. In contrast, even conditional on this factor, black men have notably worse labor market 
outcomes than do white men.xi 
Although we cannot assign race randomly, we can randomly assign resumes to 
individuals of different races, chosen to look as similar as possible and trained to act similarly, 
and see whether they have similar rates of interview and job offers.xii Such studies, called “audit 
studies,” fairly consistently find that employers discriminate among candidates based on race. 
For example, Devah Pager assigned pairs of auditors to apply for jobs in Milwaukee. She found 
that white candidates were more than twice as likely to receive a follow up call as black 
candidates. xiii However, critics of audit studies point out that despite attempts to match on dress 
and look, such studies may pick up differences between applicants, and there are concerns that 
auditors unconsciously bias the results. 
To address these criticisms, Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan randomly 
assigned black and white sounding names to resumes they sent to firms advertising job openings. 
As in the audit studies, applicant quality was unrelated to the implied race of the candidate by 
design. Still, applicants with black-sounding names were less likely to be called (6.4 percent 
compared with 9.6 percent) for an interview.xiv  There has been some dispute about whether this 
experiment captures the effect of race or names. The black female name with the highest 
callback rate gets more callbacks than the white female name receiving the least, and this 
difference has been larger in other studies.xv  
 More significantly, neither audit nor correspondence studies tell us whether this form of 
discrimination is important. Workers do not apply randomly to jobs. If black applicants have 
information about which firms discriminate, they may be able to avoid the former with very little 
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loss in terms of their labor market outcomes. Alternatively, if applications are sufficiently cheap, 
a lower success rate may be easily offset by a larger number of applications. 
Although these studies can provide compelling evidence of discrimination, they do not 
distinguish between statistical discrimination and taste-based. To attempt to identify whether 
discrimination is driven by prejudice (taste), Kerwin Kofi Charles and Jonathan Guryan 
compared wage disparities across states. They argue that because only a minority of potential 
employees are black, if prejudice is the dominant driver of discrimination, the impact should be 
driven by how prejudiced the relatively less prejudiced individuals are. Consistent with this, they 
find that disparities are largest in states with more blacks and in which relatively less prejudiced 
individuals (the 10th percentile in the state) are nevertheless more prejudiced than their 
counterparts in other states. This suggests that at least some of the gap between blacks and 
whites is driven by prejudice.xvi 
 
Education 
There is little question that there is a large achievement gap between black and white 
children, and a somewhat smaller one between non-Hispanic whites and Hispanics that emerges 
by kindergarten. There is some ambiguity as to whether the black-white gap grows or remains 
constant as children age, which Timothy N. Bond and Lang show is at least partially due to 
ambiguity in how to scale test scores.
xviii
xvii They show that when scores are scaled to predict 
educational outcomes, the black-white test score gap is fairly stable between kindergarten and 
seventh grade, at approximately .74 standard deviations.   
A wide range of factors, including school quality, home inputs, early childhood 
education, differences in innate ability, the differences in education quality between and within 
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schools, have been proposed to explain test score gaps. One strategy to measure this is to analyze 
what share of the black-white test score differential can be explained by observable 
characteristics. At least some of these studies find that controlling for socioeconomic and home 
environment differences between blacks and whites fully explains the test score gap. xix  
This does not mean that nothing can be done. Teacher expectations can also have 
meaningful impacts on the academic performance of their students.xx Students who are assigned 
to teachers with lower expectations of their ability perform worse, even after controlling for 
students’ abilities. Both black and white teachers have been shown to have lower expectations 
for their black students, and, these expectations are correct; their black students perform worse 
than their white students.  
At the same time, findings that the black-white test score gap is both predictable based on 
scores in kindergarten and largely, if not entirely, explained by socioeconomic factors, does 
suggest that successful policy may target disadvantaged students generally, rather than being 
race-specific. 
The wide range of factors contributing to education disparities highlights the 
interconnected nature of discrimination. Neighborhood segregation, which may, in turn, reflect 
housing discrimination or disparities in the labor market, can lead to segregated schools which 
may have fewer resources than predominantly white schools. Labor market discrimination can 
lead to socioeconomic status differences, which leads to fewer home resources for children.  
Another factor which contributes to the racial gaps in educational achievement is called 
stereotype threat. Stereotype threat is the phenomenon which describes how individuals 
internalize stereotypes about groups they belong to, and these beliefs become self-fulfilling. For 
example, a number of studies have found that when female students are reminded of their gender 
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before a math test, their performance goes down. Similarly, one study found that black students 
performed worse on a test when it was described as an aptitude test, relative to when it was 
simply described as a problem-solving task.xxi  
 The fact that blacks, on average, get less education than whites obscures a lesser known 
fact: conditional on their high school test scores, blacks go on to get more education than whites. 
The disparity is educational attainment is driven by blacks’ lower test scores, which we have 
noted are found very early on. Lang and Michael Manove argue that blacks’ greater investment 
in education, given their test scores, reflects blacks’ greater need to signal their ability.xxii They 
further argue that it is not driven by affirmative action in higher education because only very 
high-performing black students go on to colleges that use affirmative action while the difference 
between blacks and whites is found primarily in the middle of the skill distribution. Thus, 
compared with a similar white student who would leave school after obtaining a high school 
diploma, a black student is more likely to attempt an associate’s degree. We can only speculate 
about whether this contributes to low completion rates. The twin result of lower test scores and 
higher educational attainment conditional on test scores suggests that that improve cognitive 
outcomes for blacks through early interventions is likely to be a key leverage point in reducing 
disparities. 
Racial discrepancies are a particular issue in higher education. In 2017, black and 
Hispanic high school graduates were 16 and 3 percent less likely to attend college than white 
high school graduates, respectively.xxiii Further, only 38 percent of black enrollees and 46 percent 
of Hispanic enrollees graduate within six years, relative to 62 percent of white enrollees.xxiv This 
is partially driven by the fact that blacks, on average, attend colleges with lower graduation rates, 
which, in turn, at least partially reflects the preparation of the students who attend them.  
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Elite colleges and universities have responded to racial disparities in education by 
favoring under-represented groups in admissions decisions, commonly referred to as affirmative 
action. Evidence on the impact of affirmative action on college enrollment is mixed. By one 
estimate, affirmative action policies have nearly tripled the number of black students and more 




xxv However, another study 
found that when California ended race-based admissions at the University of California, there 
was minimal impact on the racial composition of students.xxvi One explanation for this is that 
universities changed their admissions rules to consider factors that proxied for race.  There is 
also some concern that affirmative action policies could be harmful if the benefiting students are 
less prepared than their classmates, and therefore struggle academically. There is some evidence 
that within institution graduation rates for blacks rise when affirmative action is removed.  
However, multiple studies have found that affirmative action raises the overall graduation rates 
of blacks and Hispanics.xxix,xxx,xxxi  
 
Housing 
Recent research demonstrates the importance of residential location, especially for young 
children.xxxiii
xxxiv
 Neighborhoods vary greatly in respect to safety, amenities, peer characteristics, 
public transportation and access to job opportunities. Furthermore, many resources, including 
public schools, are distributed at the neighborhood level. Therefore, residential segregation 
contributes to the persistence of racial disparities. In the 2010 Census, the average white lived in 
a neighborhood that was 75% white, 8% black, 11% Hispanic and 5% Asian. In contrast, the 
average black respondent lived in a neighborhood that was 35% white, 45% black, 15% Hispanic 
and 4% Asian.  Similarly, fewer than 5% of black children grow up in areas with less than a 
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10% poverty rate and in which more than half of black fathers are present, while 63% of white 
children grow up in these low poverty areas with at least half of white fathers present. Raj Chetty 
and coauthors estimate that up to 25% of the gap in intergenerational mobility between blacks 
and whites is due to neighborhood effects although neighborhood effects vary somewhat by 
race.xxxv  
 Residential segregation is, at least in part, driven by discrimination. Audit studies similar 
to those described in the sub-section on the labor market, reveal that prospective renters and 
buyers are treated differently depending on race although the differences have generally declined 
over time.xxxvi Audit studies of mortgage applications would be illegal, but statistical 
comparisons suggest that blacks are less likely to receive a mortgage loan than whites with 
similar backgrounds. 
  Despite this evidence, the degree to which discrimination explains residential segregation 
is uncertain. To some extent, it may reflect preferences of most people to live near others of their 
race. Further, residential segregation can arise even if nobody prefers fully segregated 
neighborhoods. If whites are willing to pay more to live in heavily white neighborhoods than 
blacks are, we may end up with completely segregated neighborhoods even if everyone prefers 
some level of integration. If, for example, all whites prefer neighborhoods that are 20 percent 
black while all blacks prefer neighborhoods that are 40 percent black, in equilibrium, we can end 
up with every neighborhood being either all white or all black.xxxvii  
 
The Justice System 
 There are racial disparities at almost every level of the justice system. Black and Hispanic 
Americans are more likely to be arrested, less likely to be released on bail, and receive harsher 
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sentences than white Americans. Black adults are 5.9 times more likely to be incarcerated than 
are white adults; Hispanics are 3.1 times more likely.xxxviii
xxxix
 Black and Hispanic youth also have 
much higher booking rates conditional on being arrested. Some of this variation can be explained 
by characteristics of the offense and the suspect’s prior record. However, there is ample evidence 
that much of these discrepancies are due to differential treatment. For example, the ACLU 
estimates that blacks are 3.7 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than 
whites despite the fact that the two groups have comparable rates of usage.  Likewise, 
conditional on stopping a motorist, police are more likely to search the car of a driver whose race 
is different from their own. Since police officers are disproportionately white, this disadvantages 
blacks and Hispanics.xl  
Some of the differences in criminal justice outcomes can be explained by neighborhoods. 
Booking rates are higher in heavily black and Hispanic areas. Police presence, arrests and 
bookings are more common in high crime neighborhoods where blacks and Hispanics are over-
represented.xli Because of where they live, white juveniles are less likely to be caught when they 
commit a crime, less likely to be arrested if they are caught, less likely to be booked if they are 
arrested and less likely to have a record if they are caught again. 
There is substantial evidence of direct discrimination and racial prejudice in criminal 
justice settings.  One study examined felony trials in Sarasota and Lake Counties, Florida, using 
random variation in the jury pool (not the actual jury) to examine the effect of race on 
convictions. All white jury pools were sixteen percentage points more likely to convict a black 
than a white defendant, but pools with at least one black were equally likely to convict whites 
and blacks.xlii   
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A growing literature is predicated on the argument that if criminal justice officials are 
prejudiced, then conditional on disposition, blacks should have more positive outcomes. Thus, 
one study finds that, conditional on estimated likelihood of re-offense, black defendants are less 
likely to be released on bail than white defendants. But, white defendants who are on the margin 
for release are 22 percent more likely to be rearrested prior to disposition.xliii Similar exercises 
documented racial prejudice in traffic stops and capital sentencing. xliv,xlv 
Not all studies point to discrimination in this direction. Some studies find that, 
conditional on being stopped and searched, black and white motorists are similarly likely to be 
caught with contraband, suggesting the decision to search is not prejudicial.
xlvii
xlvi But the 
conclusion that no difference in the conditional outcome implies no discrimination relies on 
strong assumptions about the distributions of probability of having contraband among blacks and 
whites. In a controversial study, Roland Fryer, Jr. finds that blacks and Hispanics are more likely 
to experience the use of force during a police stop but are no more likely than whites to be the 
victim of a police shooting conditional on an interaction.  Moreover, when a police officer does 
shoot, he is more likely to be the one who shoots first if the suspect is white than if he is 
black.  
 
Disparities in Medical Treatment 
 
Health is important, among other things, as an input into a child’s educational and later 
labor market success. There is a strong correlation between earnings and health, partially because 
higher earnings buy better medical care, but also because healthy individuals can earn more. 
There are clear disparities in medical outcomes by race and ethnicity. In 2015 the CDC estimated 
that the average life expectancy of a non-Hispanic black infant was 3.6 years less than that of a 
non-Hispanic white infant and 6.8 years less than that of a Hispanic infant. This is partially 
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driven by infant mortality rates that are over twice as high for black babies than for white and 
Hispanic babies.xlviii At the same time, unless one wants to argue that the medical system 
discriminates in favor of Hispanics, the discrepancy between non-Hispanic whites and Hispanics 
tells us that we cannot automatically ascribe disparities to discrimination. 
A substantial body of research has documented differences in the medical care received 
by patients of different races. Black patients are less likely to receive treatments including, for 
example, coronary artery bypass graft surgery, revascularization procedures, and thrombolytics. 
Some of these disparities reflect differences in where people live and in the quality of their health 
insurance and, therefore, to which physicians and hospitals they have access. It is difficult to 
establish whether minorities and whites are treated differently conditional on having similar 
conditions, and seeing similar physicians in similar hospitals. Amitabh Chandra and Douglas 
Staiger argue that if there is discrimination in the provision of medical care, minority patients on 
the margin of receiving treatment should benefit more from treatment than their majority 
counterparts. In contrast, they find that women and black patients realize slightly lower benefits 
from treatments following a heart attack, despite receiving less treatment. They argue that this 
suggests that, in fact, doctors may over-treat female and black patients due to equity and liability 
concerns.xlix 
One explanation for inferior health outcomes for blacks has been lower usage of medical 
research and lower compliance with physician recommendations. Blacks are less likely to visit a 
doctor for both preventative care and treatment. One study of patients treated for chronic heart 
failure seeing the same physicians at the Veterans Health Administration, found that blacks were 
no less likely than whites to be prescribed the recommended medications but were less likely 
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than whites to comply with the physician’s instructions and that the strong adverse effects on 
blacks of failure to comply accounted for the racial disparity in survival probabilities.l  
Why are black patients less likely to consume medical treatment? One answer is mistrust 
driven by a long history of mistreatment of blacks by the medical field. Perhaps the most salient 
example is the Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis, in which black men with syphilis were led 
to believe they were receiving treatment for a blood condition and were not informed of their 
syphilis diagnoses. Instead, researchers passively observed the course of untreated syphilis. Even 
after an effective syphilis treatment became available, participants did not receive access until 
1972 when details of the study became public. After the details were released, black men in areas 
closer to Tuskegee lowered their medical usage, causing a 1.5 year drop in life expectancy for 
adult black males.li 
Better communication within race may also explain blacks’ lower take up of medical 
care. One study set up a pop-up clinic providing preventive services in Oakland, California and 
randomized black men to a black or non-black (white or Asian) physician about whom they were 
provided basic information, including a photo revealing the physician’s race.lii They were then 
offered complimentary cardiovascular screening and a flu shot. After viewing the photo, subject 
choices were independent of race prior to meeting with a physician, suggesting that they were 
not prejudiced against non-black doctors. However, after an in-person meeting, subjects who met 
with a black physician were more likely to accept the services. Perhaps the black physicians were 
simply better doctors or more persuasive. Two results suggest otherwise. First, subjects rated 
black and non-black physicians equally highly on feedback forms. Second, the few subjects who 
did not self-identify as black were less likely to choose services when assigned to a black doctor. 
Moreover, conditional on services accepted, black and non-black physicians spent similar 
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amounts of time with the patients. The authors conclude that communication was better within-
race, a finding which is reinforced by the beliefs of both blacks and whites that they 
communicate better with physicians of their own race. 
The poorer communication between non-black doctors and their black patients and lower 
rates of compliance by those patients may be causally related. There is often considerable 
uncertainty regarding the best way to treat a patient presenting a set of symptoms. If (non-black) 
physicians have more difficulty assessing the best form of treatment when working with a black 
patient, they will be more likely to offer the treatment that (they believe) works best on average. 
This could result in over- or under-treatment relative to whites, but it will in either case be worse, 
on average, than treatment that responds more precisely to the patient’s condition. Since the 
treatment offered to black patients is, on average, less likely to be appropriate, the patient has 
less reason to comply. But further, knowing that their black patients are less likely to comply 
with treatment, physicians may also shift their treatment recommendations to those that are less 
sensitive to imperfect compliance.liii 
 
4. Why Does Discrimination Persist? 
In many ways, the persistence of discrimination is a mystery to economists. If there are no true 
innate differences between groups, there should be substantial returns to deviating and not 
discriminating. Thus, employers could make more profit by hiring more minority employees. We 
would only need a small number of unprejudiced potential employers to eradicate discrimination. 
While dominant group members may benefit from maintaining elite group status, it is 
implausible that group members could collude in a meaningful way. In this section we discuss 





 One explanation for the persistence of discrimination is the role of group membership in 
our sense of identity. According to this theory, individuals define themselves in the context of 
group membership. Social identification is defined as a “perception of oneness with a group of 
persons.”liv This identification leads individuals to identify with characteristics, activities, and 
organizations associated with the group.  
Crucially, identity includes a view of how people in the group should behave and a sense 
of who is not a group member. George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton suggest that individuals can, 
to some extent, reduce their otherness by adopting dominant-group behaviors, thereby increasing 
their social acceptability with the dominant group. But the reduction in otherness reduces the 
utility derived from behaving as dictated by own-group identity. Individuals choose how to 
behave depending on access to dominant group and own group resources. lv  
 In addition to any psychological benefits to identity, there are important social and 
financial benefits from group membership. Groups provide companionship, and transfers from 
other group members. People are more altruistic towards “own-group” members and those they 
perceive as more similar to themselves. Eli Berman discusses the many benefits of group 
membership in his study of ultra-orthodox Jews in Israel.lvi Berman points out that group 
members benefit from access to social insurance, a substantial set of resources reserved for in-
group members, community, and even potential marriage partners.  
In the Akerlof/Kranton model, group membership is at least partially defined by 
conforming to the stereotypes of own-group identity. Berman describes this behavior, including 
studying full-time until age 40 while often living in extreme poverty, as highly costly to ultra-
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Orthodox Jews in Israel. He explains that failing to conform to group norms would result in loss 
of group membership. This may be more intuitive in the context of religion, but David Austen-
Smith and Fryer document similar mechanisms among black adolescents. lvii They argue that 
achieving academic success is viewed as “acting white” and therefore suggests disloyalty to a 
black identity. Using data on friendship networks and own-race friendships, they find that a 
white student’s popularity is positively correlated with GPA. In contrast, the correlation between 
GPA and popularity for black students is weak at low GPA levels and negative at high GPA 
levels. As the authors are well aware, these relations are difficult to interpret. It is unlikely that 
getting good grades makes adolescent students more popular. It is more probable that factors that 
are correlated with good grades also make students more popular. Still, something weakens the 
link between these types of factors and popularity for blacks, or getting good grades (acting 
white) actually reduces popularity for black students.  
Not all research supports the acting-white hypothesis. Adjusted for socioeconomic 
background, blacks and whites report similar aspirations for completed education, spend similar 
amounts of time on homework and have similar rates of aspirations except among the highest 
performing students.lviii As we have already noted, the black-white test score gap at grade 7 is, if 
anything, less than would be predicted on the basis of kindergarten scores, suggesting that the 
poorer performance of blacks is largely socioeconomic rather than racial. 
 Although, as we have discussed previously with respect to race, the definitions of group 
may change over time, the saliency of group membership can have important effects. First, we 
all use group membership to adjust our inferences about individuals. If police officers believe 
that blacks, on average, are more likely to commit crimes, they will treat otherwise similar blacks 
and whites differently, and in turn, blacks will respond differently to police officers. The belief 
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may even be self-fulfilling. Second, since group members often share common vernacular, 
cultural norms, and social circles, employers may find it difficult to identify high ability out-
group workers.lix This will encourage out-groups to shift towards easily observed and away from 
less easily observed forms of human capital investment.  
 
 Mutually Reinforcing Disparities 
 
Importantly, disparities across domains, whether or not caused by discrimination, often 
reinforce each other. If, due to residential segregation and the lower earnings of their parents, 
black children receive lower quality schooling, they will tend to be less prepared for the labor 
market. The correlation between lower skills and race can lead to statistical discrimination that 
perpetuates racial disparities over and beyond the intergenerational transmission of economic 
status that would occur in the absence of racial differences. Due to disparities such as 
socioeconomic status and residential segregation that affect young children, black students, on 
average, arrive in kindergarten less prepared than their white counterparts. If this lowers 
teachers’ expectations for their black students, the students may confirm these teachers’ 
expectations. Lower school performance not only worsens labor market outcomes directly, but 
contributes to statistical discrimination that further adversely affects employment and earnings. 
As we have discussed, these disparities can support a sense of racial identity and a view among 
whites that blacks are other and thus contribute to prejudice-based discrimination. 
 
5. Policy Implications 
Simply prohibiting discrimination does not eliminate it. This is partly because it is 
difficult to prevent discrimination along dimensions that are correlated with race. Further, as 
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long as there are salient racial disparities, people will use race as a heuristic to make (valid or 
invalid) statistical inferences about people. This creates substantial challenges to developing 
policies that effectively target discrimination and suggests that eliminating the statistical 
association between race and many other social and economic characteristics must be both the 
goal of policy and the means through which that goal is achieved. As was the case with southern 
and eastern European immigrants in the early 20th century, this will likely come at the expense of 
elements of culture and identity. In this section, we discuss some of the challenges in designing 
policy to combat discrimination and highlight some promising policy directions.  
 
Integration 
While theoretically, contact between people from different races could increase or 
decrease both taste and statistical discrimination, the clear weight of the evidence is that, at least 
as currently experienced, contact has desirable effects. A meta-analysis of 515 studies found 
strong overall support for intergroup contact theory, under which such contact tends to reduced 
prejudice.lx 
Scott Carrell, Mark Hoekstra and James E. West use random assignment of freshman to 
squadrons at the U.S. Air Force Academy to examine how being assigned to a squadron with 
more blacks affects both attitudes and behaviors. They find that having an additional black 
member in a squadron of roughly 35 people increases the probability of having a black 
roommate as a sophomore (usually not a freshman squadron member) by about one percentage 
point or about 18%. However, their estimates imply that having one rather than no black 
squadron members has no effect on the probability of a having a black sophomore roommate if 
the black member’s academic score was 1.5 standard deviations below the Air Force Academy 
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average. Similarly, those exposed to more and better black peers were more likely to say that 
they had become more accepting of African Americans and less likely to say that they had 
become less accepting. Again, it appears that attitudes are worsened only if the black squadron 
members to which they are exposed are substantially less academically prepared than average.lxi  
The results from the Air Force Academy suggest that there is a role for policies that 
increase integration in schools and neighborhoods, at least provided that they do not involve the 
mixing of groups that are too disparate along other dimensions. The goal is to breakdown both 
prejudice and the statistical association between race and disadvantage. Increased exposure to 
blacks who confirm negative stereotypes is unlikely to be beneficial. At same time, the Air Force 
Academy experience suggests that fairly large gaps are still compatible with beneficial effects. 
Subject to legitimate concerns about projecting from results at a unique institution, these results 
imply that increasing the number of black students at an elite institution is likely to decrease 
prejudice even if the average additional students are at the 25th percentile of the institutions 
enrolled students. 
This perspective also sheds light on the debate about whether colleges should be required 
to use color-blind but not color-neutral policies instead of directly using race in admissions. As 
we have noted, by relying on correlates of race instead of race, itself, colleges have largely been 
able to maintain the number of minorities that they enroll. However, as Fryer, Glenn Loury and 
Tolga Yuret show, such policies end up enrolling a quite different set of students, with 
noticeably lower test scores among black students.lxii In addition, when we use policies that are 
race-blind but not race-neutral, we may, intentionally or unintentionally, use selection criteria 
that favor certain groups. For example, a rule admitting students in the top 10 percent of students 
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in their high school class to the University of Texas not only favors blacks and Hispanics but 
also favors students from schools with more low-performing students. 
 
Information  
 As we have discussed, even when we decide that using certain characteristics, such as 
race, in decision-making is not permissible, we sometimes permit policies that are race-blind but 
not race-neutral. This poses two key challenges. First, this requires identifying criteria that are 
necessary or reasonable for effective screening. The second is that sometimes there are 
unintended consequences of limiting information available to decision-makers. 
In Griggs v Duke Power, a decision it has since overturned, the Supreme Court ruled that 
Duke’s use of a high school diploma as a requirement for employment in certain jobs was illegal 
because it had an adverse disparate impact on black applicants, and because there was no 
business necessity, since many people without high school diplomas had done those jobs 
successfully. The struggle of the Court with disparate impact cases reflects the difficulty of 
determining whether a practice is designed to discriminate, or whether it exists for good reason, 
with disparate impact an unfortunate unintended consequence. In Griggs, the Court ruled that to 
be permissible, the policy generating disparate impact must be shown to be a business necessity 
but later relaxed this standard.  
The standard for justifying adverse impact has become increasingly relevant in the era of 
big data, when algorithms can predict an individual’s race with great accuracy. But given that 
such algorithms are often quite opaque, an organization could unwittingly use race in its 
decisions. Consider a judge who, when deciding whether to grant bail, cares only about the 
probability the defendant will be rearrested prior to disposition. She may turn to an algorithm 
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that predicts the likelihood of re-arrest. Many of the predictors of re-arrest, such as number of 
prior offenses, zip code, family situation, will be correlated with race. Therefore, any model will 
create a prediction that is correlated with race. Determining which variables should be included 
and how much correlation is too much is far from straightforward. Further, as discussed above, 
conditional on committing a crime, blacks are more likely than whites to be arrested. So even an 
ostensibly unbiased algorithm generated using arrest data will likely result in bias. 
Even determining whether a policy limiting the information used in screening will 
decrease discrimination can be challenging. Consider the heated debate around the use of 
criminal records to screen potential employees. We know that revealing a criminal record 
reduces the probability a worker is interviewed or hired. Blacks are more likely than whites to 
have criminal records. Therefore, requiring information about criminal records has an adverse 
impact on blacks. In response, some locations have “banned the box,” prohibiting employers 
from requesting such information on applications although typically they can later conduct a 
background check or ask about it at an interview. But, when firms cannot use criminal records to 
screen applicants, they may screen them using correlates of criminal history, such as being a 
young black man. Amanda Agan and Sonja Starr submitted job applications for black and white 
male candidates with randomly assigned resumes both before and after the box was banned in 
New Jersey and New York City. Prior to “ban the box,” companies with the box called black and 
white male candidates without criminal records for interviews at similar rates. After the box was 
banned, callbacks of black men relative to otherwise similar whites declined.lxiii  Consistent with 
this, another study found that when states ban the box, the probability of employment falls by 3.4 




Others studies have found consistent results that increasing information in hiring tends to 
help black candidates. Abigail Wozniak finds that drug testing increases the employment of 
black candidates. 
lxvii
lxv Like Agan and Starr, Wozniak hypothesizes that with less information, 
employers rely more on race to make decisions. Similarly, there is evidence that requirements of 
occupational licensing increases the share of minority workers in an occupation, despite lower 
pass rates on licensing exams.lxvi Another study finds that prohibiting employers from using 
credit reports in hiring reduced job finding rates for blacks.  These studies show that adding 
more information in hiring, even when that information is highly correlated with race, may 
actually move employers away from using race directly. This suggests a more challenging job 
for the courts when judging adverse impact cases. This is further complicated by the fact that, in 
equilibrium, hiring practices by one firm impact other firms. Therefore, if a set of firms 
introduces additional information into hiring practices, they will likely increase the quality of 
hired workers, which may decrease the quality of the available worker pool. More research is 
needed to understand how these practices impact hiring in equilibrium. 
 
Key Leverage Points 
We have noted that disparities tend to reinforce each other. Barbara Reskin describes 
these interrelated disparities as a “system of discrimination” and argues that policy addressing 
discrimination in one domain must recognize this system or set of interactions. Consequently, 
she maintains that the most effective policy solution is a broad policy attack, like the civil rights 
reforms of the 1960s, that hits many components of the system.lxviii There is certainly evidence 
that these policies reduced racial disparities in education and earnings.lxix  
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Reskin also argues for the potential large impact of policies targeting discrimination at 
leverage points. Leverage points are key points at which change is likely to have a substantial 
system-wide impact. She speculates that residential segregation is a particularly promising 
leverage point because many resources exist at a neighborhood level, making disparities almost 
inevitable. A number of policies may help integrate neighborhoods. These include increasing the 
stock of affordable housing units in higher income neighborhoods, reducing exclusionary land-
use policies, and increasing the availability of affordable public transportation.lxx,lxxi  
Many researchers have pointed to education as a potential leverage point, although 
generally without using this language. Education, especially early education, is one of the first 
institutions we interact with in life. To the extent that education provides children with the skills 
they need to be employable and successful as adults, any intervention which does not address 
disparities in education is likely to be, at best, incomplete. Some of this can be addressed by 
decreasing inequality in education. There is strong evidence for long-term effects of high-quality 
early education.lxxii lxxiii There is growing evidence that school spending matters.   
As discussed above, there is compelling research that teacher expectations impact student 
performance. There is some evidence that education programs can reduce teacher bias.lxxiv There 
is also some evidence that black students who are randomly assigned to black teachers have 
higher rates of high school graduation and college attendance.lxxv However, assigning black 
teachers to primarily black students may also come at a cost of increasing segregation, especially 
if, instead of increasing the supply of black teachers, this is done by moving black teachers from 




We have argued that the strong statistical relation between race and various outcomes 
fosters statistical discrimination, and that social distance reinforces this discrimination by 
interfering with within-race preferences and communication across races. Our twin goals are 
therefore to reduce the statistical associations and the social distance. Unfortunately, as in the 
example of moving black teachers to primarily black neighborhoods, these goals can be in 
contradiction. When possible, policies which can both decrease disparities and increase 
integration have the highest potential to decrease discrimination. And, as we have highlighted, 
policy impacts are not always consistent with the intent of the policy. We therefore encourage 
policy makers to enable empirical research on potential policies whenever possible. 
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